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THE CELEBRATION OF A VIOLENT PAST:
ABOUT SOME LOCAL SOURCES
OF THE RECENT WAR
IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA*
Bosnia-Herzegovina is the site of a striking number of World War II
monuments erected on or in the immediate vicinity of mass graves.
These memorials are bones of contention and generate violent inter-
-ethnic animosity. This article gives an extensive description of the
trials and tribulations of one of these war monuments and the Serb
and Croat communities involved. It addresses an aspect of ethnic
cleansing that has hitherto been the focus of very little research, i.e.
the destruction of mass graves. It is hypothesized that mass graves
and the related commemorative ceremonies constitute a key to
understanding the stagnating ethnic identification and the recent
revival of war violence in rural Bosnia-Herzegovina. The article
advocates a more systematic inquiry into the local sources of the war
in this part of the former Yugoslavia.
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Far from simply serving to divert hostile impulses in a harmless
direction, human ritual is employed to exhort people to war and
violence (...) as long as intergroup hostilities have existed,
rituals have been used to express them (David Kertzer 1988).
* This article is based upon documents and field work I conducted intermittently between
1983 and 1995. The names of almost all the people and some of the places have been
changed. I would like to express my gratitude to my informants in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and elsewhere in Europe for their assistance, protection and hospitality. For their
comments on earlier versions of this article, I would like to thank Wim van Binsbergen,
Bill Christian, Ger Duijzings, the late Ernest Gellner, Caroline Hanken, Dieter Hanners,
Daan Meijers, Ed Koster, Estellie Smith, Lev Orec, Fred Spier, Sjef Vissers, Alex
Weingrod and the editors of this journal. Of course I alone bear full responsibility for the
contents of the article.
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... the conditions that lead to (large-scale) violence require a
micro foundation based upon social organization in rural and
small-town life... (David Laitin 1995).
Bosnia-Herzegovina was a mass-murderer's dream come true, a
mighty necropolis of empty mass graves, high and dry, waiting
to be filled (Brian Hall 1994).
Introduction
Late in the summer of 1992, just before nightfall, a loud explosion
resounded in Bijakovići. Bijakovići is one of the hamlets of Međugorje, the
parish in western Herzegovina that has expanded since the start of the
alleged Marian apparitions there in the early 1980s into a pilgrimage
centre of world-wide importance (cf. Bax 1995). I was just about to get up
from the table and see what happened when the huge hands of my host,
Franjo B., pushed me back in my chair. "It is nothing... we'll stay inside",
he said emphatically. In bed that night, I thought it over. Apparently
Franjo did not want me asking any questions. For that matter, not one of
the family members in the room had paid any attention to the explosion. It
was as if everyone was prepared for it, and then simply continued on about
their business.
We were working on the land the next morning when I brought it up
again, but Franjo acted as if he did not hear me. It was not until the lunch
break, when I said I would go to have a look in the direction of Šurmanci,
the hamlet I thought the sound of the explosion had come from, that my
landlord and friend reacted. At the end of the afternoon, he said, he would
show me what had happened.
Without a word, we drove toward Šurmanci in his old Volkswagen. I
was familiar with part of what barely deserved being called a road, for I
had been there a year before the war. Since I was then so insistent, my
previous host and I had gone to see a war monument. But before we got
very far, we were startled by a volley of rifle shots — coming according to
my informant from Chetnik sentinels — and we had no choice but to beat
a hasty retreat.1
1 The term Četnici [Chetnik, Chetniks] originally referred to the legendary and often
glamourized Serb buccaneers and gangs of bandits from the era of the Early Ottoman rule
who, or so the story goes, rose up at regular intervals in an effort to cast off the despised
Turkish yoke. In both of the world wars, Chetniks were a para-military organization of
Serbs who saw it as their formal task to support the regular Serb troops and maintain law
and order in the region. In practice, however, it was not unusual for them to operate in
small, independent units led by war lords and terrorize the Croatian and Bosnian Croat
countryside. As such, they were extremely disliked by the Croat community. After the
World War II, these mini-armies soon fell into decline. Later, however, Chetnik
resistance groups were known to play an active role, especially in the eastern Bosnian
countryside, where they were the "strong arm" of regional ultra-nationalist Serb
movements. Up to this very day, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina still call
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About half way there, we turned into a side road. Unlike the first
part, it was nice and smooth. We made another turn and a few kilometres
further on we stopped at what looked like a huge parking lot in the middle
of nowhere. The Neretva River flowed past at the bottom of the ravine to
the left, and steps had been hacked out in the mountainside to the right,
leading to a shapeless mass of stone that lit up brightly in the setting sun.
We silently climbed the partly ravaged staircase — sixty-eight steps, I
remember. It stopped at a plateau with the remains of a monument.
"Friends blew up this blasted Chetnik thing", Franjo informed me with a
torrent of curses. And he added emotionally in his schoolboy English: "We
killed the dead because they kept them alive" — an ultimate form of ethnic
cleansing, I thought.2 He spit with contempt on the remains and turned
away. He barely gave me time to film and to take photographs.3 On our
way back in the car, I felt the tension growing between us, and did not say
a word. The road was so bad that the cooling-system pipe on his old Polo
broke, and as I started asking questions while he repaired it, the "bomb"
really burst. "Why, why, why... you always want to know why!" Hadn't I
ever noticed that people didn't want to answer my questions about
Šurmanci? (I had.) Hadn't I ever noticed that no taxi, or anyone at all, ever
wanted to go to Šurmanci? (I had.) Hadn't I ever noticed that the people
here all acted as if Šurmanci didn't exist? "Look at the road. It is almost
impossible to drive down that road. Everyone from around here tosses
their garbage alongside the road. There are no signs telling you the way to
Šurmanci. At the church, all the hamlets are listed on the big tablet — not
Šurmanci. In all the guidebooks for tourists, the hamlets here are described
— not Šurmanci. You can buy postcards and slides of almost every spot
around here — not of Šurmanci." Franjo concluded his tirade, alluding to
my not being more perceptive, by saying: "To us here, — Šurmanci is
dead... we want to forget."
A few days later, Father Leonard, one of the Franciscan parish
priests, revealed a bit more of the secret. He told me people wanted to
pretend Šurmanci did not exist because it reminded them of oppression,
humiliation and forced labour. During World War II, he explained, many
Serbs from the vicinity, especially from nearby Žitom, were killed by local
Ustashi, as the Serbs invariably call the Croats, and tossed into the ravine at
their Serb compatriots Četnici. For more information about Chetniks past and present,
see Čopić (1964), A. Đilas (1991), Tomasevich (1975) and Malcolm (1994).
2 At first sight, "killing the dead" seems an odd expression. For the outsider, it is
important to know that in the Bosnian countryside, the deceased continue to be part of
the kinship group. Via them, their progeny can lay claim to the use of land and water and
to the produce of fruit and olive trees. It is not until all the traces of their lives have been
wiped out that these claims cease to exist.
3 In the following year, after I had collected more extensive visual material about ravaged
war monuments and mass graves, all this material that was so valuable to me was
destroyed by a warlord from the vicinity. He had probably been informed about my
activities, which might have compromised him. Using the threat of violence, he forced
me to hand over my entire collection.
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Šurmanci.4 And from the establishment of the communist Tito regime
after World War II, their descendants and other relatives had been taking
every opportunity to remind the Croats of what had happened. The
monument at Šurmanci was the largest and most painful reminder. Father
Leonard concluded: "Here almost every village and neighbourhood has a
painful reminder like that."5
A few weeks later — by then I had left — Međugorje was startled by
a few enormous explosions. Villagers from Žitom, who were said to be
fanatic Serbs, had blown up the crucial part of the bridge over the Neretva,
destroying the most important connection between the Brotnjo Plateau and
Mostar. Pursued by a group of Croat rezervisti, the people of Žitom fled
with their families high into the Velež Mountains, where they settled in a
former Muslim village now controlled by a Serb military unit.6 For the
time being, the long tradition of violence and enmity between two rural
communities in the region was brought to a halt.
Since the outbreak of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992,
a great deal of attention has been focussed on what the underlying causes
might have been. How is it possible, observers have wondered, that people
who lived side by side in peace for decades on end suddenly developed
such fierce animosity? The answer is often sought in the recent past: Tito's
policy, aimed at the integration of Yugoslavia's many peoples and
nationalities, failed; and the spectre of ethno-nationalism was revived by
4 The Ustaša [Ustashi] movement is also said to have originated in a distant past, when
"intrepid Croat warriors took arms against alien rule". According to authoritative
historical sources, however, the Ustashi movement emerged in response to the
hegemonic aspirations of the Serbs in the first decades of the twentieth century. At the
start of the 1940s, the movement became the official "strong arm" of the fascist
Independent State of Croatia (NDH). In fact, many of the units operated independently and
cruelly terrorized the Serb people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. After World War II, the
movement was largely liquidated by the new communist government. Nonetheless, a
number of cells continued underground, especially in western Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
birthplace and traditionally the centre of the movement. Still today, Serbs from the
region call every Croat an Ustaša (plural: Ustaše). More information on this movement's
past and present can be found in Jelić-Butić (1983), Ristić (1966), Banac (1984), Hory &
& Broszat (1965), Križman (1983), Paris (1961), Starčević (1971), Tolstoy (1986) and
Tomasevich (1975).
5 When the communist regime in the former Yugoslavia began to disintegrate in 1982,
people started to speak hesitantly and sometimes even to write about the World War II
mass graves and monuments and their background. Official, government-propagated
views always seemed to have an unofficial counterpart sustained by the less powerful
segment of the population, and diametrically opposed to the official version (cf. Glenny
1992, Brey 1993, Rathfelder 1992, Reissmüller 1992, 1993, Denich 1991, Soldo n.d.).
It nonetheless remained a highly sensitive subject, and when the "big war" broke out in
Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992, the openness once again became a thing of the past.
6 Rezervisti refers in popular usage to all the militias that were active in the recent war,
including the independently operating war lords with their men as well as the reserve
troops from the old state or federal army, the gangs of soldiers who had deserted and roved
about the countryside plundering, and the "weekend militias", which were bands of
relatives and neighbours who went out to pillage and raid in hostile territory.
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extremist political leaders at the top (cf. Glenny 1992, Slapšak 1993,
Anstadt 1992, Irvine 1993, Pleština 1992, Schöpflin 1993, Brey 1993,
Thompson 1992, Peternel 1993, Parin 1993, Denich 1994, Meštrović
1996, Čale Feldman 1993, Hayden 1993a). Explanations of this kind
certainly have their merits, but in one important respect they fail: they do
not clarify why and how hostility was perpetuated. Šurmanci's monument
for the dead and the related enmity between the people of Međugorje and
Žitom provide an interesting opportunity to shed more light on this aspect.
The case illustrates in detail that in actual fact this animosity never ceased
to exist, but had been deliberately preserved and regularly nourished by
collective rituals. For decades, the enmity was concealed by political terror
and hidden behind the official communist rhetoric viewed in Western
circles as the only truth. For a better understanding of the war in Bosnia-
-Herzegovina, more research is urgently called for at the local level and
focused upon such ritual markers as war monuments cum mass graves
(also see Denich 1994).
Gatekeepers and peasants
On the east bank of the Neretva River, where numerous roads lead from
the mountain villages to the age-old trade route from Mostar to the
Adriatic, there are a couple of small towns. These vratari [gatekeepers], as
both the towns and their inhabitants are called locally, were founded in the
early decades of domination by the Ottoman Empire, between 1470 and
1550. They were small garrison strongholds that oversaw the
communication between the mountain villages and the market centres
along the river. The predominantly Muslim population earned a living
collecting tribute for the various authorities, maintaining law and order in
their area, and charging tolls on all the traffic of passengers, goods, and
animals between the market centres and the peasant communities (Balić
1992, Vego 1981). In view of their function, it is no wonder the
gatekeepers were unpopular with the peasants and the merchants from the
towns. They were regularly ambushed by gangs of revengeful peasants,
who were just as regularly disciplined by the garrisons. Their wealth made
the gatekeepers attractive to gangs of roving bandits (Koljević 1980, Balić
1992, Wilson 1970).
Žitom was one of these gatekeepers; it controlled almost the entire
Brotnjo Plateau. Žitom is still associated with a winepress (preša za grožđe),
as the precious grape juice from the plateau was appropriated there, and
the worthless peel remained behind.
When the Ottoman Empire began to waver in the latter part of the
nineteenth century, a group of Serb rebels from Montenegro took
advantage of the opportunity to conquer the rich town of Žitom, banish or
murder the local population, and occupy the luxuriant settlement
themselves. However, the whole area soon fell under Hapsburg rule. In
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their efforts to pacify and incorporate the mainly Croat peasant popu-
lation, the Hapsburgs were only too happy to use the militarist
Montenegrin Serbs (Soldo 1964, Vego 1981). Ever since then, Žitom has
been a symbol of Serb oppression and exploitation for the Croats of the
Brotnjo Plateau.
In 1929, after the foundation of the Serb-dominated Kingdom of
Yugoslavia, hostilities soon escalated and the region became the site of
more and more bloodshed. Groups of East Bosnian Chetniks, originally a
loosely organized auxiliary of the national police, began to terrorize the
population of the Brotnjo Plateau. With Žitom as their home base — and
soon with the support of mjesni četnici (local fighters) — they would
pillage the plateau. They raped women, stole cattle, destroyed vineyards
and water cisterns, burned houses and barns to the ground, and viciously
penalized any resistance (Soldo n.d.). An elderly informant from
Međugorje — at that time a twelve-year-old child — compared those
calamities to the recent hostilities: "Nothing has really changed... the only
thing is that the horses have become tanks and armoured cars."
The officially authorized reign of terror of the Chetniks evoked a
Croat counterpart: supported by nationalistic political circles from Split
and the surrounding area, Brotnjo peasants organized vigilante and
resistance groups. Međugorje became the centre of the new Ustashi
movement for the Brotnjo, battling a perpetual mini-war with Žitom (Soldo
1964 and n.d.).
In the early years of World War II, this regional violence formation
was incorporated into a war figuration of national proportions. Backed by
the Axis powers, the Independent State of Croatia (the NDH) was founded
(1941), and Bosnia-Herzegovina was to be part of it. With the help of the
para-military Ustashi organization, and not infrequently the overt support
of the Roman Catholic clergy — the young state took every opportunity to
cleanse Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina of Serb elements. In addition to
forced conversions to Roman Catholicism, mass deportations and
massacres were among the means used to that end (see Alexander 1979,
Ristić 1966, A. Đilas 1991, Maček 1957, Tomasevich 1975, Jelić-Butić
1986).
In Međugorje, the Ustashi headquarters of the Brotnjo, "preparations
were made for action". Reportedly in conjunction with groups from
Čapljina, Humac, and Široki Brijeg, plans were made to cleanse the
peripheral regions of the Brotnjo. Žitom was high on the list in this
connection. "In the late summer of 1942, the time had come", one of my
most belligerent informants told me. All the people of Žitom — insofar as
they were not in active battle somewhere else — were taken prisoner and
herded into a colossal bunker built into a cliff by the Germans. The plan
to close off the entranceway and leave them there was abandoned, or so
my informant told me, when a "better" option came up. A column of
lorries packed with Serb prisoners and under German command changed
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hands near Žitom, and the Brotnjo Ustashi were now in control. They
added their "shipment" from Žitom and headed toward Šurmanci. There,
far from the inhabited world, the prisoners were slaughtered like cattle and
tossed into the ravine — nobody knows exactly how many people died
there.
Like the other hamlets involved in atrocities of this kind, Međugorje
was severely punished. In the end, the outcome of the reprisals carried out
later by Tito's Partisans, was that the parish of Međugorje lost about half its
population and suffered considerable material losses (Maček 1957, Craig
1988, Anonymous 1986).7 This was not the end of it, for, concealed
behind official communist rhetoric, Međugorje was to go through a
lengthy period of subjugation and humiliation after World War II.
Forced labour and humiliation
The liberation committees set up by Tito and his Partisans in World War II
to serve as local authorities in the liberated territories were not adverse to
the use of violence. In the post-war period as well, as the new "civil society"
was constructed, violence, intimidation and terror continued to be integral
policy components (see Alexander 1979 and Ristić 1966). Numerous
newly created official positions at the federal, national and local levels were
"awarded" to "liberators of the people". Formally expected to carry out
party politics, in actuality they ruled as potentates whose main aim was to
accumulate wealth and settle old accounts (see Alexander 1979, Soldo n.d.,
M. Đilas 1977).
Former Partisan commander Stojan Stojanović was the first to visit
the ghost town of Žitom after World War II. Together with a few other
young men who were members of the same clan, he had been able to
escape the heinous revenge the Ustashi took on his native town. The men
had joined a Montenegrin Partisan unit. Their power and influence had
mushroomed in the course of the post-war cleansing campaign to
eliminate the Ustashi movement in the region. In view of their success, they
were put in charge — allegedly by the party — of the administrative,
economic and demographic reconstruction of Žitom.
Within little more than a decade, by the early 1960s, it was as if a
miracle had taken place in the ravaged town. Almost all the houses had
7 The Partizans headed by Tito were the newest of the three resistance movements active on
Yugoslav territory during World War II. It was predominantly Serbs who joined this
generally well-organized communist military and political organization. Very few Croats
from Bosnia-Herzegovina played a role. After the war this organization was able to
consolidate its power and establish a federation of socialist republics, initially following
the Russian example. Almost all the important government positions were occupied by
ex-Partizans. Especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was not unusual for them to rule as
local potentates. More extensive information can be found in A. Đilas (1991), M. Đilas
(1977), Parin (1991), Maclean (1990), Roberts (1973) and Tomasevich (1975). For
specific local circumstances see also Smilan (1977) and Soldo (1964).
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been rebuilt and were now occupied by relatives of the former residents,
the bridge over the Neretva had been repaired, the roads had been repaved,
and a new small Serbian-Orthodox church had even been built.
Whence this "miracle"? Some sources mention considerable
government funding supplemented by special Soviet aid earmarked for
their sorely afflicted Serb brothers (Vego 1981, Soldo 1964). In another
publication (Smilan 1977), references are made to continual assistance
from Serb emigrants and Gastarbeiter. Still another source emphasises the
energy and the Partisan mentality of the local population (Dragan 1978).
In addition to these possibly correct and relevant explanations, Soldo
(n.d.) notes another point that deserves special attention here. After World
War II, he observes, the Brotnjo Plateau — like other regions in Bosnia-
-Herzegovina — was carved up into a number of unofficial provinces
(kolonije) "ruled" by local (Serb) Partisan leaders: a power constellation
that was still in existence at the outbreak of the most recent war.8
Stojan Stojanović and his fellow clan members controlled Međugorje
and the adjacent neighbourhoods of Bijakovići and Šurmanci. The
villagers themselves contributed greatly to the reconstruction of Žitom and
the prosperity of its inhabitants. Up to the late 1960s, every household that
had been linked to the Ustashi movement — according to the authorities,
that included all the Croat households in the region — had to make
"reparations" or pay off "war debts" to the Partisan Fund, which was in
actuality managed by the Serb establishment. Whoever refused to do so
was accused of subversive nationalistic conduct, invariably resulting in
imprisonment (Soldo n.d.).9
By the end of the 1960s, these "policies" made way in theory for a
policy aimed at the promotion of "brotherhood and unity", but served, in
fact, to reinforce ethnic animosity. The republic's government in Sarajevo
made funds available to "promote the cultural legacy", and local authorities
could submit proposals in this connection.10 In Međugorje, the population
was confronted with this "promotion" in the spring of 1970. It took quite a
bit of prodding on my part to get a few of the villagers to tell me about it.
"A van of armed men came: "Chetniks" from (Žitom). They stopped at the
crossing where the late Đuro Šivrić's house used to be. Further down the
8 In 1992 I was informed about the existence of extensive documentation material on these
ethnically based hostilities in the region. A reporter from Mostarski List had accumulated
a collection of documents based upon his own investigations in the archives of the
newspaper, awaiting an appropriate moment to publish them. I was able to read and leaf
through some of them and make copies of certain parts I felt were extremely salient.
When I wanted to continue my investigative work in 1993, the newspaper building turned
out to have been completely destroyed, just as almost all the buildings in the centre of
Mostar.
9 Almost all the young men of Međugorje at the time spent some time for this reason in the
jails of Mostar, Sarajevo or some other town in the former republic of Bosnia-
-Herzegovina.
10 Cf. Mostarski List, 12 March, 1968.
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road, they blocked off part of the mountain with little red flags... Later we
heard explosions, and that evening we saw part of the mountain had been
blown up. Then we had to come and work, chopping stones and carrying
them away. But no one came. That is why the police from Čitluk took the
people from their homes. A lot of men fled to the mountains, but when
they came back home at night, the police came and took them away."
Bit by bit it became clear to the local people that the "Chetniks" were
building a monument to their World War II comrades, and that the people
from the Brotnjo Plateau — alleged Ustashi — had to do the actual work.11
For almost three years, the people of Međugorje, Bijakovići and Šurmanci
did all they could to sabotage the work, but the authorities continued to
force them to do their share in building the monument. Without exception,
obstruction led to arrests, which meant either paying a fine or doing a few
days of forced labour.12 Soon, the building site was popularly referred to
as Goli Otok, taking its name from the notorious state prison on an island
off the Adriatic coast (Soldo n.d.).
After the unveiling ceremony on April 27, 1973, the humiliation
continued. The authorities never had trouble finding a reason to punish
someone, especially considering the way the villagers were prone to act.
Garbage discarded alongside the road had to be removed, potholes in the
surface of the road had to be repaired, there had to be more and better
parking space. There was an almost endless succession of acts of sabotage
and punishment, with annual peaks around April 27. That was when
thousands of the detested "Chetniks" would come from far and wide in
their automobiles to gather together and celebrate the past; Partisan
heroism, anti-Fascism, and party loyalty were the main themes on these
occasions. The visitors were loud-mouthed, or so I have been told, and
uncouth, and this evoked local objections, which in turn incited the
authorities to do their best to "get matters back to normal", for example, by
ordering villagers to clean the streets.
Toward the mid-1980s, some years after the alleged Marian
apparitions, which attracted masses of pilgrims, this complex of ethnic
animosity faded into the background. "It was thanks to the power of the
Mother of God", said Father Leonard, though others felt it was "thanks to
the economic boom in Međugorje from which the authorities benefited
from as well". Whatever the case may be, there were no further large-scale
ceremonial events near the mass grave of Šurmanci.
In 1992, when the Serb-controlled state monopoly over the
organized means of violence disintegrated, the monument near Šurmanci
11 According to some local informants, in the beginning of the 1960s a modest monument
had been built at the same spot. However, I was unable to uncover any further details.
12 Father Širo, who was serving the parish at the time, also had to haul stones as
punishment for giving a sermon in which he compared the parishioners to the Jews who
had to make tiles for the Egyptian oppressor.
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"disintegrated" as well. "But the memory lives on — on both sides",
lamented the parish priest.
Discussion and conclusion
Western ethno-theory still seems to dominate the study of ethnicity and
other forms of collective identity in the social sciences. It is based on the
premise that cultural affiliations reflect blood ties and have a
predetermined quality of inevitability. It is assumed that people are who
they are and what they are because they were born to be so, and that
membership in a group is given at birth and can never be changed
(Linnekin & Poyer 1990; see also Bringa 1993). It will be clear that this is
only one of many possible models for conceptualizing and experiencing
cultural differences and similarities. For different peoples have different
notions and ideas about what determines who they are and to which
category of people they belong. In peasant societies, people locally define
and construct their identity according to their own perceptions and
experiences, in interaction with other local or neighbouring groups; this
may be in congruence or at odds with the official state forms of
categorization.
In his important article "Identification in Expanding Circles" (1994),
Abram de Swaan tries to break away from these rather narrow Western and
static notions by focusing on identification. Social identification, he
argues, involves a dialectics of inclusion and exclusion, and a dynamics of
competition between groups; it is an ongoing process which tends to
expand and include ever-more people. Human beings entertain multiple
and shifting identifications in concentric and intersecting circles. Wider
identifications, the author claims, are re-enacted and intensified in the
primary setting of family and peer groups. Adopting a historical and
developmental perspective, De Swaan describes and explains how social
identifications were restricted to kinship groups until the advent of
agricultural society and the emergence of identifications based on
proximity. Only in the mass politics of urban-industrial society were social
identifications extended to larger entities, such as class, race, and nation.
Today, an identity with Humankind in its entirety is emerging. This
ultimately encompassing identification, De Swaan observes, lacks the
dynamics of inclusion/exclusion and rivalry, but may yet be vitalized by a
sense of global threat and common human destiny.
De Swaan's approach seems much more adequate not only for
historical and cross-cultural research but also for coming to grips with the
dynamics, ambivalencies and ambiguities of cultural categorization.
However, the author fails explicitly to explore the mechanisms and factors
causing stagnation in or even reversal of the overall process of expanding
identification (cf. also Mennell 1989). Šurmanci's mass grave monument
and the related annual commemorations, described above, seem to
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constitute such a stagnating mechanism. "Officially", in accordance with
the government's policy, the ceremonies were explicitly non-ethnic: it was
the "victims of Fascism" who were commemorated, without any reference
to their ethnic background. But since the Serbs were locally in power,
"unofficially" things were different. Thus, by systematically enacting the
past, the mutual identifications of Serbs and Croats were kept alive, which,
in turn, virtually precluded the possibility of social identification on a
higher level of social inclusion, that is, in terms of Bosnians or Yugoslavs.
Šurmanci's mass grave monument and the related ceremonies also
constituted a most powerful reservoir, so to speak, of traumatic memories
and feelings of hatred (cf. Kertzer 1988). As long as the state monopoly
over the organized means of violence was kept intact, these memories and
feelings remained relatively suppressed. But when that monopoly
collapsed at the beginning of the recent war, they turned into viciously
violent behaviour. Thus, it may be hypothesized that mass graves and
related ceremonies constitute a key to understanding the stagnating, ethnic
identification and the recent revival of violence in rural Bosnia-
-Herzegovina (cf. Denich 1994, Das 1990, Hayden 1992, 1993a, Volkan
1988).
Šurmanci's war monument is not the only one of its kind. To date
(end of 1998), I have been able to trace sixteen similar "ritual centres". In
each case, they are a symbolic expression of the long-term power and
dependency relations between Serb power centres and the Croat
communities dominated by them. And in each case, these emotionally
charged sites were blown up by small militant groups of Croats shortly
after the recent crumbling of the power apparatus, thus destroying the last
territorial ties and claims of the opponent. The assumption would thus
seem justified that there is evidence here of a more general pattern,
characteristic of western and southern Herzegovina, of ethnically based
antagonism between pairs or clusters of village communities.
If this assumption is well-founded, it can also open new options for a
better understanding of the recent war in this part of the former
Yugoslavia. It can then become clear that the bloodshed did not come out
of the blue, nor was it the direct result of some fifty-year-old spectres that
were revived by extremist political leaders at the top (cf. Denich 1994,
Hayden 1993a). Instead, it constituted a temporary intensification and
expansion of an ongoing process of maintaining and reproducing
extremely passionate ethnic antagonism — a process that mainly unfolded
at the local level where mass graves and related commemorative
ceremonies played a key role (cf. also Denich 1994). It can also become
clear that the term war as it is used in Bosnia-Herzegovina should not be
taken to mean the same thing as in other parts of the world. The generic
term rat not only pertains to violent processes between regular armies at
the national or state level, but also to more private feuds between families
and clans, as well as to all the more flexible and temporary violent
operations at intermediary levels of societal integration. Thus, any
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discussion about the recent war in the former Yugoslavia should pay due
attention to this conceptual complexity and phenomenal
interconnectedness — rather than to attempt to arrive at some neat, tidy set
of distinctions and definitions (cf. also Meštrović 1996).
There is one intriguing question that should be addressed here: Why
did Western circles up until recently know virtually nothing about this
more general pattern of ethnically based antagonism? A partial
explanation can be sought in the effective concealment strategies of the
communist regime under Tito. Every effort to draw public attention to
nationalistic differences was relentlessly suppressed or depicted by the
strictly censored Yugoslav state press as "manipulation by capitalist
powers", "undermining activities on the part of subversive elements", or
simply as the work of "gangsters". Virtually without a word of criticism,
Western European intellectual and political circles accepted this version as
the truth. Any critical inquiry into the recent past of Yugoslavia was
punishable by a lengthy prison sentence (Balić 1992, Kideckel 1993,
Ramet 1984). In addition to Stalinist communists, the infamous political
prison at Goli Otok, situated near a popular tourist island in the Adriatic,
was predominantly populated by historians, journalists, and authors who
had shed a critical light on the former Yugoslavia's recent past (Balić 1992,
Soldo n.d.).
This Western unawareness was not alleviated by any anthropological
or ethnographic studies at the local level. On the contrary; in their
impressive review article written in 1983, Halpern and Kideckel did not
mention a single publication about local-level political relations and
processes, for the simple reason that there were none. The study of
nationalism in Yugoslavia was politically dangerous and thus taboo in
anthropological circles, and that of ethnicity long remained confined to
analyses of the cultural content of ethnic identity (e.g. Hammel 1969,
Lockwood 1972, 1975, 1978, 1981) or focused on the politically relatively
innocuous inter-state level (e.g. Beck and Cole 1981, Sugar 1980). And as
late as 1991, in anthropological circles the phenomenon of
ethno-nationalism in former Yugoslavia was dismissed as "folk ideology"
(cf. Šimić 1991). It was not until the recent outburst of violent warfare that
anthropologists focused on the region became painfully aware of their
selective attention and of its consequences for their perception of the local
roots of the war (e.g. Kideckel 1993, Halpern 1993, Šimić 1993, Denich
1991, 1993, 1994, Hayden 1993 and 1993a, Despalatović 1993, Ballinger
1994, Bowman 1994).
Norbert Elias noted repeatedly that social developments are
characterized by a combination of regularity and randomness,
explainability and pure chance. On lower levels of integration, occurrences
that might be regular and explainable on a high level become erratic,
unpredictable, and dependent on random circumstances and personal
quirks. Ever since the Middle Ages, the processes of state formation and
state development in Western Europe have exhibited regularity and
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structure, development in a certain direction, and can be analyzed and
interpreted as such (Elias 1982 and 1989; see also Wilterdink 1993). It is
from this perspective, characteristic of Western Europe, that the
developments in former Yugoslavia in general and in Bosnia-Herzegovina
in particular are generally examined and evaluated, using terms like erratic,
irrational, pointless and inconsistent. The case of Šurmanci shows that what
might seem random and unpredictable on a higher societal level
demonstrates a large extent of regularity and explainability at a local level.
The conclusion seems obvious that for a better understanding of the recent
problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina — and possibly for the present problems
of violence in Europe in general (cf. Laitin 1995) — attention should be
more intensely and systematically devoted to processes and developments
at lower levels of social integration.
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SLAVLJENJE NASILNE PROšLOSTI: O LOKALNIM IZVORIMA
RECENTNOG RATA U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI
SAžETAK
U Bosni i Hercegovini nalazi se iznimno veliki broj memorijalnih spomenika žrtvama
Drugoga svjetskog rata podignutih u neposrednoj blizini masovnih grobnica. Ti su
spomenici predmet razdora i izazivaju međuetnički animozitet. U radu se opisuje sudbina
jednoga od tih spomenika oko kojega se spore Srbi i Hrvati. Članak se bavi aspektom
etničkoga čišćenja koji dosad nije bio u središtu istraživanja — uništavanjem masovnih
grobnica. Pretpostavlja se da se masovne grobnice i s njima povezane komemoracije mogu
tumačiti kao ključ za razumijevanje nepromjenjive etničke identifikacije i nedavne obnove
ratnog nasilja u ruralnoj Bosni i Hercegovini. Autor se zalaže za sustavnija istraživanja
lokalnih uzroka rata u tome dijelu bivše Jugoslavije.
Ključne riječi: politička antropologija, rat, Bosna i Hercegovina
